EPIDEMIC MITIGATION BY STATISTICAL INFERENCE FROM CONTACT TRACING DATA

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
We need more efficient strategies to mitigate an epidemic.



Main conclusion: If tests are reported within a day and adoption is good (\sim 30–50%) contact tracing can reduce significantly the epidemic.

CONTACT TRACING DATA

- Information about individuals (stored on the phone of the individual):
 Age, syndromes, health related-risks, results of tests, etc.
- Information about contacts (stored on the phone of the two individuals):
 Time, duration, distance during the contact, barrier-measures used (mask etc.).




CONTACT TRACING: CURRENTLY


- Wikipedia: "COVID-19 apps"
- Contact tracing as mostly implemented currently (Google & Apple, DP3T, etc.): contacts are contacted and advised to be tested or to self-isolate.
- Current status: Test results communicated with several-day delays, and very low negligible influence on the epidemic.



Upon a positive test of an individual, his/her recent, sufficiently close, and long

adoption rate, very small rate of notifications is tested positive. Resulting in currently






- Strong privacy requirements to satisfy the Canadian government and public (need
- ML methods to produce more accurate prediction of risk, not just the binary event







BETTER THAN CURRENT TRACING: INFERENCE OF RISK

- Risk can be estimated more accurately than listing contacts with infected and spread the information to their neighbours.
- What is needed from the app? Communication between individuals who have been in contact (in an encrypted manner, only small bandwidth needed). Exchange of simple messages (probabilities) when in contact.
- Related works:
 - Covi white paper, by Bengio & MILA: 2005.08502
 - ViraTrace (I. Bestvina): https://github.com/ViraTrace/InfectionModel.
 - CRISP: A Probabilistic Model for Infection Risk Estimation 2006.04942

individuals. Individual should account for increased risks of their neighbours

OUR WORK: DEVELOPMENT OF ALGORITHMS FOR RISK INFERENCE

- Belief propagation on trajectories, probabilistic model that conditions the SIR dynamics to the observations. (builds on Altarelli, Braunstein, Dall'Asta et al, PRL'14, Braunstein, Ingrosso Sci. Rep.'16)
- Mean-field risk estimation (builds on Lokhov, Mézard, Ohta, LZ, <u>PRE '14 & PRE '15</u>):

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Inferring the origin of an epidemic with a dynamic message-passing algorithm

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We study the problem of estimating the origin of an epidemic outbreak: given a contact network and a snapshot of epidemic spread at a certain time, determine the infection source. This problem is important in different contexts of computer or social networks. Assuming that the epidemic spread follows the usual susceptible-infected-recovered model, we introduce an inference algorithm based on dynamic message-passing equations and we show that it leads to significant improvement of performance compared to existing approaches. Importantly, this algorithm remains efficient in the case where the snapshot sees only a part of the network.


PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 05.20.-y, 02.50.Tt

I. INTRODUCTION

Understanding and controlling the spread of epidemics on networks of contacts is an important task of today's science. It has far-reaching applications in mitigating the results of epidemics caused by infectious diseases, computer viruses, rumor spreading in social media and others. In the present article we address the problem of more detailed information about the epidemic than just a snapshot at a given time [10]. Note, however, that all the present methods are limited, for instance none of them makes an efficient use of the information about the nodes to which the epidemic did not spread.

In this paper we introduce a new algorithm for the estimation of the origin of an SIR epidemic from the knowledge of the network and the snapshot of some nodes at a cortain time. Our algorithm actimates the probability





STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM

- Individual i at time t is in a state $x_i^t \in \{S, I, R\}$; the whole trajectory \mathbf{x}_i .
- Prior $P({\mathbf{x}_i}_{i=1}^N)$ is given by a spreading model, its parameters and an initial condition.
- Observations: individual i reports results of tests of symptoms at time t.

► Goal: Compute the probability $P_A^i(t) = P(x_i^t = A), A \in \{S, I, R\}$ over all trajectories compatible with the observations.

Prior (spreading model) & observations => risk estimation

"PRIOR" FOR INFERENCE: SUSCEPTIBLE-INFECTED-RECOVERED (SIR) AGENT-BASED MODEL


- Population of N individuals Spreading of a virus
 - Susceptible individuals (S) Can be infected
 - Infected individuals (I)
 - Removed individuals (R)

- Can infect others

$$x_{i}^{t} = S \rightarrow \begin{cases} x_{i}^{t+1} = I \text{ w.p. } 1 - \prod_{j \in \partial i(t), x_{j}^{t} = I} (1 - \lambda_{ij}(t)) \\ x_{i}^{t+1} = S \text{ w.p. } \prod_{j \in \partial i(t), x_{j}^{t} = I} (1 - \lambda_{ij}(t)) \end{cases}$$

Parameters:

- the barrier measures etc



• $\lambda_{ii}(t)$ attack rate = probability that if susceptible i meets infected j, j infects i. Depends on the duration and distance of contact,

• μ_i : Recovery rate = probability of person i becoming removed in one time-step. Depends on the individual (age, health, etc)





ESIAN INFERENCE

- Individual i at time t is in a state $x_i^t \in$ $P(\{\mathbf{x}_{i}\}_{i=1}^{N}) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left[p(x_{i}^{t}) \right]$ Prior: Including the observations: $P(\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^N \mid \mathcal{O}) = \frac{1}{Z(\mathcal{O})} P(\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^N) \prod_{i=1}^N p(\mathcal{O}_i \mid \mathbf{x}_i)$ $P(\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1}^N \mid \mathcal{O}) = \frac{1}{Z(\mathcal{O})} \prod_{i=1}^N \left[p(x_i^{t=0}) p(\mathbf{v}_i^{t=0}) \right]$
- on the posterior.

{*S*, *I*, *R*}; the whole trajectory
$$\mathbf{x}_i$$
.
 $t=0$) $\prod_{t=1}^{T} p(x_i^t | \partial x_i^{t-1}, x_i^{t-1})$]


$$\mathcal{O}_i | \mathbf{x}_i) \prod_{t=1}^{T} p(x_i^t | \partial x_i^{t-1}, x_i^{t-1}) \Big]$$

▶ Goal: Compute the probability $P_A^i(t) = P(x_i^t = A), A \in \{S, I, R\}$ as the marginal

GRAPHICAL MODEL

Transformation avoiding short loops:

- Belief Propagation iterative update for probabilities of trajectories (each trajectory at most 2 change points):
 - $m_{i \to i}^{n+1}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_j) = \mathscr{F}$
- This is conjectured to give the exact marginals on large random tree-like graphs with independent evolution of contacts and observations.



$$\mathcal{F}_{BP}(\{m_{k\to i}^n(\mathbf{x}_k,\mathbf{x}_i)\}_{k\in\partial i})$$

ALTARELLI, BRAUNSTEIN, DALL'ASTA ET AL, <u>PRL'14</u>, BRAUNSTEIN, INGROSSO <u>SCI. REP.'16</u>, **ARXIV:2009.09422**







OUR WORK: DEVELOPMENT OF ALGORITHMS FOR RISK INFERENCE

Braunstein, Ingrosso <u>Sci. Rep.'16</u>)

Mean-field risk estimation (builds on Lokhov, Mézard, Ohta, LZ, <u>PRE '14 & PRE '15</u>):


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Belief propagation on trajectories, probabilistic model that conditions the SIR dynamics to the observations. (builds on Altarelli, Braunstein, Dall'Asta et al, PRL'14,



"PRIOR" FOR INFERENCE: SUSCEPTIBLE-INFECTED-RECOVERED (SIR) AGENT-BASED MODEL

- Population of N individuals
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Can be infected

Can infect others

Parameters:

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• μ_i : Recovery rate = probability of person i becoming removed in one time-step. Depends on the individual (age, health, etc)

What is the probability of person i to be in state S, I or R at time t? $P_S^i(t)$, $P_I^i(t)$, $P_R^i(t)$



DYNAMICAL MESSAGE PASSING (DMP)

- Lokhov, Mézard, Ohta, LZ, <u>PRE '14</u> & <u>PRE '15</u> gave dynamical message passing exact on tree-like graphs as $N \rightarrow \infty$

No observations (test results + symptoms) included!!!

• Given an initial conditions $\{P_S^i(0), P_I^i(0), P_R^i(0)\}_{i=1}^N$ + parameters $\{\mu_i(t), \lambda_{ii}(t)\}_{i=1}^N$

algorithm to give $\{P_{S}^{i}(t), P_{I}^{i}(t), P_{R}^{i}(t)\}_{i=1}^{N}$ that are (conjectured to be) asymptotically



MEAN-FIELD MESSAGE PASSING (SIMPLIFICATION & SMALL λ limit of DMP)

time evolution equations for $P_S^i(t)$, $P_I^i(t)$, and $P_R^i(t)$

$$P_{S}^{i}(t+1) = P_{S}^{i}(t) \left(1 - \sum_{j \in \partial i(t)} P_{I}^{j}(t)\lambda_{ij}(t) \right)$$

$$P_{R}^{i}(t+1) = P_{R}^{i}(t) + \mu_{i}P_{I}^{i}(t)$$

$$P_{I}^{i}(t+1) = P_{I}^{i}(t) + P_{S}^{i}(t) \sum_{j \in \partial i(t)} P_{I}^{j}(t)\lambda_{ij}(t) - \mu_{i}P_{I}^{i}(t)$$

• Given an initial conditions $\{P_S^i(0), P_I^i(0), P_R^i(0)\}$ + parameters $\rightarrow \{P_S^i(t), P_I^i(t), P_R^i(t)\}$



Parameters:

- $\lambda_{ii}(t)$: Probability that if susceptible i meets infected j, j infects i: • depends on the individuals: barrier measures etc • depends on time: duration and distance of contact
- μ_i : Recovery probability of person i:


• depends on the individual (age, health, etc)

• $\partial i(t)$: Sum over ALL the individuals i was in contact with at time t: Tracked with App

Include the observations (test results + symptoms)



FEED-BACK LOOP: USE TEST RESULTS



$\{P_{S}^{i}(t), P_{I}^{i}(t), P_{R}^{i}(t)\}$

Use Information to update probabilities at t- Δt

$\{P_{S}^{i}(t), P_{I}^{i}(t), P_{R}^{i}(t)\}$


Get better estimates of the probabilities at time t

- An infected person has been infectious for the time τ : $P_I^i(t') = 1$ for $t - \tau \le t' \le t$
- A recovered person cannot change state: $P_R^i(t') = 1$ for $t' \ge t$
- A susceptible individual has not yet been infected: $P_{S}^{i}(t') = 1$ for $t' \leq t$

RESULTS



EXPERIMENTS ON CONTROL OF EPIDEMIC, TESTING HIGHEST-RISK NODES




Tests: symptomatic = 50% of all infected, and 21 from ranking.

Random geometric contact graph in 2D, scale 1.1, daily on average 7.4 contacts. Population size = 10000,

- $\lambda = 0.02$, $\mu = 0.03$. Initially 20 infected + 10 time steps of uncontrolled evolution,

EXPERIMENTS ON CONTROL OF EPIDEMIC, TESTING HIGHEST-RISK NODES



the risk estimation algorithm. Positive individuals are isolated.



Parameters: N=500 000 individuals, contact network is random geometric graph with 6 contacts a day. Epidemic spread from SIR model with $\lambda=0.05, \mu=0.02$, 200 patients zero. Uncontrolled epidemic for first 10 days, then every day we test 50% infected 5 days after their infection, and 1500 tests according to the ranking given by


ROBUSTNESS EVALUATIONS

- Partial usage/adoption of the tracing application.
- False positive & negative tests.

Epidemic spreading model and contact network more realistic and not matching the prior. (OpenABM https://github.com/BDI-pathogens/OpenABM-Covid19 by Hinch et al.)



EXPERIMENTS ON CONTROL OF EPIDEMIC: OPEN_ABM




Randomly test & isolate. Trace & test & isolate. MF-trace & test & isolate. BP-trace & test & isolate.

Parameters: N=500 000 individuals, contact network and spread from OpenABM. 50 patients zero. Uncontrolled epidemic for first 10 days, then every day we test 50% infected 5 days after their infection, and X tests according to the ranking given by the risk estimation algorithm. Positive individuals are isolated.

Key point: Even though the MF/BP inference procedures do not capture most of the details and complexity of the Oxford OPEN_ABM model, they still work and provide large improvement over competing current contact tracing methods.



EXPERIMENTS ON CONTROL OF EPIDEMIC: PARTIAL ADOPTION OF TRACING APP



Randomly test & isolate. Trace & test & isolate. MF-trace & test & isolate. **BP-trace & test & isolate.**


Parameters: N=500 000 individuals, contact network and spread from OpenABM. 50 patients zero. Uncontrolled epidemic for first 10 days, then every day we test 50% infected 5 days after their infection, and 2500 tests according to the ranking given by the risk estimation algorithm. Positive individuals and their households are isolated.

Point: For these parameters, the performance deteriorates at <70% adoption.</p>





EXPERIMENTS ON CONTROL OF EPIDEMIC: FALSE TESTS



Randomly test & isolate. Trace & test & isolate. MF-trace & test & isolate. **BP-trace & test & isolate.**

Parameters: N=500 000 individuals, contact network and spread from OpenABM. 50 patients zero. Uncontrolled epidemic for first 10 days, then every day we test 50% infected 5 days after their infection, and 5000 tests according to the ranking given by the risk estimation algorithm. Positive individuals and their households are isolated.

Point: For these parameters, even 20% false negative tests are supported.





CONCLUSION:

ONGOING WORK:

- Embedding in other realistic agent-based simulators.
- Learn parameters of the algorithm from observed data (neural-enhanced) risk estimation).

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Probabilistic estimation of risks allows more efficient control of the epidemic.

